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RECENT EXERCISES IN GROWTH ACCOUNTING: 
NEW UNDERSTANDING OR DEAD END?* 
Richard R. Nelson 
?he growth accounting literature has been enriched recently by several 
major quantitative studies, and a sophisticated technical dialogue. l The 
obvious high quality of this work may lead some economists to think that 
great progress has been made in our understanding of economic growth and 
that we are nearly home. I suggest that while recent research has increased 
our knowledge, studies of this sort have run into sharply diminishing returns 
and soon will arrive at a dead end leaving many essential open questions. 
In Section I, I will consider some basic difficulties with growth accounting. 
Several of the points raised here have been raised before but appear to have 
been repressed in the recent discussions; it seems important to introduce 
them again to the dialogue. Most growth accounting purports to rest on the 
nee-classical theory of economic growth. In Section II, I shall argue that 
this theory is more a way of looking at things than a real theory, and that 
neo-classical spectacles may distort or block perception of phenomena that 
should be at the center of a serious theory of economic growth. I shall conclude 
by providing a preliminary sketch of a proposed growth theory built on 
Schumpeterian rather than neo-clas.sical perceptiotts. 
Some Basic Limitations of Growth Accounting 
The logic behind growth accounting appears to be simple, but appearances 
* The author is indebted to C. Diaz Alejandro, R. Evenson, w. Fellner 1
Y. Kislev, W. Nordhaus, and J. Tobin for useful discussion and criticism. None 
of these necessarily agrees with all or any of the thrust of this paper. 
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are deceiving. In this section I shall discuss two basic difficulties of 
growth accounting. One is the problem of distinguishing between movements 
along a production function and shifts in that function. The second is the 
problem of treating experienced growth as the sum of the contributions 
made by separate factors. 
The problem of competing explanations. From its beginnings growth 
accounting has been concerned with trying to estimate how much of growth 
can be explained by movements along a production function, and how much can 
be attributed, at least in part, to advances in technological and organizational 
competence, The early studies recognized quite explicitly the difficulties, 
perhaps even the theoretical impossibility, of distinguishing between alternative 
explanations of observed growth patterns without rather strong a priori 
. 2 assumpt ions. The growth patterns here refer to time series data. The a priori 
assumptions could come from cross section data or other empirical sources. 
Some of the recent studies appear to give the impression that on the basis 
of rather weak a priori assumptions there is a theoretically correct way of 
distinguishing movements along a production function from shifts in it. 
It seems important, therefore, to review the basic problem. 
The discussion here will not be focussed on any particular study or set 
of numbers but on the general problem. The difficulty can be seen sharply 
if one assumes the following stylized aggregative facts. 
3 Output (GNP) has 
been growing at the same rate as capital and at a faster rate than labor; 
hence the capital output ratio has been constant and output per worker and 
the capital-labor ratio have been rising. Factor shares have remained constant; 
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thus the rate of return on capital has been constant and the wage rate has 
risen. These "facts" very roughly characterize the U.S. growth experience that 
the accounting exercises seek to explain. Consider the following two com­
peting explanations, both consistent with the time series data. One is 
that the underlying production function is Cobb-Douglas (of unitary elasticity 
of substitution) and technical change has been neutral in the sense of Hicks. 
The second is that the underlying production function has an elasticity of 
substitution less than one, and that technical change has been labor saving. 
The differences between the explanations can be seen in terms of how 
they explain growth of output per worker. The first interpretation is 
depicted in Figure 1, the second in Figure 2, Points (a) and (b) in the 
two figures are identical and the slopes of the curves (the marginal productivity 
of capital) at those points also are identical.. However the curve in Figure 1 
that goes through point (a) shows a greater tendency to diminishing returns 
than the curve of Figure 1 (the elasticity of substitution between capital 
and labor is lower). Also, the curve through (b) in Figure 2 does not represent 
an equal proportiocal increase in output per worker for each capital-labor 
ratio compared with the curve through point (a). Rather the proportional 
increase is greater for a high capital··labor ratio than for low (technical 
change has been labor saving)" 
The two interpretations are different in the following "growth accounting" 
sense. In the case of Figure 1 output per worker would have grown by ~ll if 
capital per worker had grown as it did, cut the production function had not 
shifted. ~12 represents the increase in output per worker not explained by 
growth of the capital-labor ratio and hance due, in some sense, to technical 
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change. In Figure 2, Li can be attributed to growth of capital per worker21 
and 6 to technological change in the sense above. File for future22 
reference that the "contribution" of technical change is estimated by subtracting 
the contribution of other factors. This aside, under the first interpre-
tation a larger fraction of productivity growth is attributed to growth of 
capital intensity. In the latter interpretation the lower elasticity of 
substitution means that less of productivity growth can be attributed to 
g~owing capital intensity, hence more must be attributed to improved technology. 
As Diamond, McFadden, and Rodriguez (among others) have pointed out, since 
both interpretations are equally consistent with the data there is no way 
to choose among them, without a priori assumptions. Thus the growth accounting 
is arbitrary. 
The discussion above r.ts not dealt explicitly with an important char­
acteristic of many recent growth accounting exercises; the attempt to take 
into account increases in factor quality as well as quantity. But exactly 
the same issues are involved. The way quality changes are handled (in principle 
at least) in the recent literature is to divide gross factors into subgroups 
of different quality and estimate the expansion of each. Thus the quality 
4problem is translated into a disaggregation of quantity problem. All of 
the preceeding discussion applies. 
In fact the growth accounting exercises have not proceeded by attempting 
to specify a particular "production function" and estimate its parameters. 
Rather the strategy is somehow to build up an input "index" that measures 
the contribution of input growth to output growth without explicit committment 
to a particular production function. There is a semantic problem here. 
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The "input index" really is an estimate of output under the assumption of 
constant technology. In any case this research methodology does not av6id 
the problem but simply evades it. 
The use of a particular weighting or index scheme for input growth is 
the growth accountant's de facto assumption about the shape of the production 
function. A starting place for all growth accounting is the assumption 
that, if the neo-classical theory holds, at any time factor prices equal 
marginal productivities. Thus it is natural to weight factor inputs by their 
prices. But prices when? They are likely to vary over the period in question. 
One could use inietial price weights. If one did this one would be in effect 
assuming that the production function followed the tangent at point (a) in 
Figures 1 and 2. If there were any curvature at all to the function this 
procedure would lead to an overestimate of the contribution of input growth 
and an underassessment of the contribution of technological change. Or one 
could weight percentage input growth by the initial "share" of income. In 
effect this would be assuming that the production function was Cobb-Douglas. 
Both of these assumptions obviously are arbitrary and lead to arbitrary growth 
accounting. 
There seems to be a belief that the use of Divisia indices gets around 
5this problem. The Divisia index in theory weights inputs at any moment 
of time by their prices at that moment. While more traditional indices use 
(arbitrary) fixed weights, the Divisia index uses continuously changing 
weights. There are many reasons why the Divisia index is appealing. However 
the use of the Divisia index does not resolve the problem. 
Ideally in using the Divisia method one would estimate the instantaneous 
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rate of production function shift by the method proposed by Solow--percentage 
output increase minus factor share weighted percentage input growth. 
l) dA = dQ _ S dL _
A Q L L 
Integration then would yield a moving index of total factor productivity. 
In practice factor price weights cannot be re-estimated continuously but on 
a yearly (or other periodic) basis. This amounts to a de facto assumption 
that within periods the production function is Cobb-Douglas. Thus this 
procedure means that within each sub-period the contribution of input growth 
and technology shift is estimated on the basis of interpretation la. This 
clearly is arbitrary, but can be rationalized by appeal to a "Taylor's series" 
argument, and in any case is not the basic problem. 
If time intervals are short the difference between the intra-period 
interpretations shrinks. In the limit, for infinitesimally small proportional 
input changes (and changes in technology), we cannot distinguish between 
the different interpretations; they yield the same attribution. This is so 
because we are moving along curves with initially the same slope, and for small 
changes in inputs even large differences in curvature (elasticities of 
substitution) will not show up. But if the total attribution is over a 
finite period of time, the fact that the overall period is divided up into 
a large number of very short periods does not help at all. As the sub-time 
periods shrink and the intra-period di=ferences get smaller, a larger number 
of these need to be added up over the total period. The problem does not go 
away. Nor would the problem disappear if we didn't have to worry about the 
practical reality of finite sub-periods. It is the finiteness of the total 
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comparison period that causes the difficulty. 
The dashed lines between points (a) and (b) in Figures 1 and 2 are 
identical. They are meant to represent a smooth growth of output and input 
between two discreetly different points of time. Both time paths will yield 
the same Divisia index series of inputs, since along the path inputs and 
factor prices (shares) are the same. The Divisia index series for inputs 
is, in several recent studies, the implicit specification of output growth, 
had technology not changed. Under our stylized data assumptions capital's 
share is constant. This means that the Divisia index of inputs moves like 
a Cobb-Douglas with constant output elasticities, or along the curve through 
point (1) in Figure 2~ The use of the ~ivisia index for inputs thus 
will yield the attribution of growth to increased factor inputs and to 
technical change of Figure 1. But the data are consistent as well with 
Figure 2. 
The problem lies in the failure of the Divisia formula for an .index 
of technology to face up to the basic problem. Integrating the Solow 
instantaneous technical change equation yields: 
log Q(t)2) log A(T) - log A(o) = SL(t) d log L(t)dt dt 
However the time path of factor shares is what it is because of both changes 
in factor ratios and technological change. The Divisia formula fails to 
distinguish between alternative explanations of factor shares. Thus under 
the interpretation of Figure 2 the capital share would have fallen but for 
the fact that technical change was capital using. If one wants to attribute 
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to factor growth only what output growth would have been had technology been 
constant, then one must use in equation (2) not actual "shares," but the time 
path of shares as they would have been had technology not changed. 7 But 
to do this requires that one be able to specify the original production function 
which was the original impass. 
The route out of the impass requires more specification based on other 
data. For example, one could attempt to estimate the elasticity of substitution 
from engineering design data. Or, if one had access to cross-section data 
on outputs and inputs as well as time series data, under certain assumptions 
one might be able to sort out the shape of the production function from 
shifts in that function. Assumptions about momentum or independence can 
facilitate discrimination. One can assume that variation in the rate of 
change of the capital-labor ratio is large relative to variation in the pace 
and character of technical advance, or that movements in the two are independent 
of each other. Then if one found that when the capital-labor ratio increased 
rapidly there was a fall in capital share, but when the capital-labor ratio 
increased by the same amount but over a longer period of time (more slowly) 
there was no fall in the share, this would be evidence that the elasticity 
of substitution was less than one and that technical change was labor saving. 
This is Fellner's approach in a recent paper (1971). In any case, in order 
to do growth accounting in a non-arbitrary way we need knowledge that goes 
beyond the data that are used in the growth accounting. 
The meaning of growth attribution. Let us assume that the problem 
described above is solved. Then it would be possible to pose the following 
question: how much growth would we have experienced had only technology 
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changed, or enly capital, or only labor, or only capital and labor, or various 
other combinations of factors. However it is uncertain what meaning one 
would give to the answers. If by attribution to a particular factor we mean the 
growth that would have occurred had it alone changed, the relative attribution 
to growth of different factors is not independent of the time period in 
question, even if all factors are changing at a constant rate. Further, 
while using this meaning of attribution the sum of the attributions adds 
up to total growth for very small time periods,they may not add up to total 
growth if finite time periods are considered. These points were raised earlier 
by Levine and Massell, but seem to have been ignored in the recent discussion. 
The recent literature appears to get around the problem by posing the 
attribution problem in a different way. Hou much of the average yearly growth 
rate that we have experienced would we have attained if durine an average 
year technology alone had advanced at its average rate, or capital alone, 
etc.? While this resolves the technical problem it of course does not solve 
the basic problem that the very meaning of a growth attribution is obscure. 
Assume that interpretation 2 is known to be correct, that the production 
function is Cobb-Douglas and technical advance is neutral, and that all 
factors were growing at constant rates. Assume that by attribution to a 
factor we mean the amount of output growth that would have occurred had that 
factor alone changed. Measure the instantaneous growth rates associated 
with the yearly growth rates of capital and labor. Label these AK and AL. 
Estimate the instantaneous rate of technical progress by the Solow method 
using the instantaneous rate of output growth. Call this AA. In the case 
of infinitesimally small changes the attribution to technical advance 
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relative to capital growth can be expressed as follows: 
Attribution to Technical Advance
3a) = Attribution to Capital Growth 
And the following expression tells how much of total growth was contributed 
by technical change: 
Attribution to Technical Advance4a) = Total Growth 
All this is nice and neat, with attributions to individual factors adding 
up to total growth. 
All the neatness goes when finite time periods are considered. For 
capital and technological change the attribution ratio is as follows: 
AAT 
Attribution to Technical Advance e - 13b) = Attribution to Capital Growth AKSKT 
e - 1 
As T ➔ 0 the ratio refers to very small changes and should asymptotically 
yield expression 3a. Since both nu112rator and denominator go to zero, 
l'Hopital's rule must be applied. Then it is seen that as T ➔ 0 the attribution 
AA 
ratio does approach sT. However assume finite T. Then the ratio is 
KK 
different. Indeed as T increases the expression increase5 toward infinity 
or falls to zero as AA exceeds or falls short of AKSK. Relative attributions 
to different factors are sensitive to the time period in question. 
Notice also that under our concept of attribution, over a finite period 
of time total growth may not be attributable to the separate factors. Indeed 
in the Cobb-Douglas case the percentage of total growth explained by growth 
of any particular factor, with the others held constant, shrinks to zero 
-12-
as the time period increases. For technical advance, for example: 
Attribution to Technical Advance
4b) = Total Growth 
- 1 
This expression clearly goes to zero as T increases. 
At first glance all this seems strange, but it is not. Growth accounting 
simply does not get at what some practitioners seem to claim it gets at-­
relative contributions to growth of different factors. It does not get at 
that question because the question has no answer if we are interested in 
finite changes over a finite period. The problem here is the same one that 
plcgued the profession many years ago when it was trying to attribute total product 
(rather than growth) between the different factors. We learned then that 
this was impossible. We could attribute at the margin. But there was no 
way of attributing shares of the total. 
To see the problem from another perspective look again at Figure 1 
and assume the time period is one year. 6
11 
measures how much output would 
have grown had technology remained constant. It is analogous to the numerator 
of equation 3b. 6 is the measure of the contribution of technological12 
change measured as a residual, but it does not measure how much output would 
have grown over the year had capital remained constant. It is not analogous 
to the denominator in equation 3b. The distance between points (c) and (a) 
measures that. Call this ~12*. This is the same as 612 only for very small 
changes. For finite changes, even a year, 6 plus 6 * do not add up to11 12 
total growth. To get total growth one must add an "interaction term." 
The standard growth accounting appears to get around this problem, 
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but it does not. In the first place the conversion to an average yearly 
change rather than an instantaneous change means that for that average year 
the "contribution of technical change" overestimates what growth would have 
been had factors actually remained constant over that year; ~12 exceeds ~12*. 
But this discrepancy is very small. The real problem is that the contribution 
of technical change to growth, or of expansion of any particular factor, 
during any year is not independent of what ha·ppened to the other factors 
prior to that year. Let us continue to assume interpretation 1 and constant 
rates of change of the factors of production and technology. .Consider 
a year toward the end of the accounting period. The contribution of say capital 
during that year is as large as it is because labor and technology had advanced 
8during the prior periods as much as they did. 
The attempt to get numbers for the contribution of different factors 
to the growth process rests on misspecification of the process. Experienced 
growth is not the simple sum of the contributions of separate factors. 
In the Cobb-Douglas neutral technical change case all factors are complements. 
A finite increase in labor increases the output expansion that will result from 
a finite increase in capital, and vice versa. Technological advance and 
factor increase are also complementary, the first increases the marginal 
productivity of the second, the second increases the gain from a given percentage 
increase in total factor productivity. In this Cobb-Douglas neutral technical 
change case one certainly can go through the technical operations of attributing 
average yearly growth to a sum of average yearly contributions. But the 
meaning of such an attribution is quite unclear for considering finite 
growth•. One could say that over a finite period the contributions multiply, 
rather than add. But this is to admit that the "accounting" or "adding up" 
metaphor is I!!islending., And unless one knows that the production function 
is Cobb-Douglas one doesn't know that the contributions "multiply." The 
"division of credit" flavor of the growth accounting becomes even more obscure 
when one recognizes stronger forms of com~lementarity, like the requirement 
for educated people t:o do research an<l development, and of new physical 
capital to embody new technology. 
One could take the position that the degree of interaction among the 
factors is small, and that the seperable contributions of the different 
factors are like the first terms of a Taylor's expansion. This is a plausible 
position but rests on an assertion about the nature of the production function 
and about technical change. The approximation might be good, and it might 
be poor. 
The thrust of these remarks is no_!:_ that growth accounting is unilluminating. 
Growth accountinG has been ext~emely useful in knocking down simple-minded 
notions. The early uork of Abramowitz~ Solow, and Kendrick demonstrated 
that there almost surely had to be more to grouth than simple augmentation 
of physical capital and labor. Denison and Griliches mapped out a list of 
possible factors, and soci.e plausible rough estimc,tes of their importance. 
Griliches and Jorg2nson have contributed significantly to ou:-:.- knowledge of 
the time path of cert2in of the factors bei1 ind growth. ~hanges over time 
in the estimated averagQ yearly contribution L1ade by different factors, in 
particular variations in the residual, ar8 interesting and suggestive facts 
to know about, as are cross country and cross indt:.:stry differences. 
Assumptions about momentum ~nd independence permit some rough inference 
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drawing. But some of the recent studies seem to imply that we can get more 
than this from growth accounting, that somehow the growth accounts really 
explain growth. I do not see how they can. We cannot get to a tested theory 
of growth through growth accounting alone, and that particular route 
strikes me as now at a stage of very low marginal return. 
Do We Have a Growth Theory of a Plausible Kind? 
In order to do non-arbitrary growth accounting, and to know if growth 
accounting is a meaningful summary approximation to the sources of growth, 
we need additional knowledge. Ideally what we need is a tested growth theory 
with confident estimates of parameter values. If we had such a theory we 
could do everything that growth accounting can do (although not all that 
growth accounting purports to do). And without such a theory we really 
can't do growth accounting. Almost all of growth accounting claims its 
intellectual justification as the nee-classical theory of economic growth. 
But does such a theory exist? To the extent that it does exist in part, is 
it believable? 
Neo-classical theory as a point of view, not a theory. What would a 
theory do for us, if we had one? In the first place we would expect the 
theory to give an explanation, an account (if not an accounting) of past 
growth. This immediately poses the question--an account of what phenomena? 
What needs to be explained? Certainly the aggregative time series data 
(at an economy or sector level) on output, input, and prices. The data show 
that beneath the aggregate (mean) figure for say labor productivity or 
the profit rate there is a considerable dispersion of firms around the mean. 
-16-
I would argue that the theory ought to be at least consistent with, or better 
explain, the disaggregated data. r would argue that the theory also ought 
to be consistent with, or better explain, what we observe about process, 
a point with which many might disagree, and to which I will return later. 
What do we mean by an explanation? I assume we mean computational 
ability of the theory to replicate reasonably closely the phenomena to be 
explained, given estimable parameter values. But generally we want more of 
a theory than just ability to replicate the past. There may be alternative 
explanations that it is interesting or important to distinguish among. I 
assume that an acceptable "explanation" does not leave unanswered questions 
that economists find interesting, like the two probed in the preceding section,· 
How much of the economic growth we have experienced would have been possible 
in the absence of technological advance? To what extent can the explanation 
of growth be in terms of the contribution of different factors, or is this 
misleading because growth involves a strongly complementary package of factors? 
It is apparent that an interest in distinguishing among alternative explanations 
of growth is highly influenced by our hope that the theory may be useful 
to policy. The two questions above have obvious significance to growth policy. 
Limiting the present discussion to ability to explain the "macro" 
data, I suggest that the neo-classical theory isn't really a theory. In 
particular different versions of the grab bag of things called neo-classical 
theory answer these questions in different ways. 
suggest that the spirit of most of the growth accounting exercises 
indicates de facto acceptance of a model that presumes considerable sustained 
growth is possible without technical advance, and that factor complementarity 
I 
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is not particularly important. The implicit theory is that output is a function 
of technology, effective capital, and effective labor. The elasticities of 
substitution among capital of different qualities, and among labor of different 
li ties, i assume be in. f'inite. 9 The elasticity of substitution betweenqua s d to . 
effective capital and effective labor implicitly is assumed to be relatively 
high, probably in the neighborhood of unity, and certainly not close to zero. 
There is considerable ambiguity regarding the connection between technical 
advance and capital and labor quality. Basically, however, growth accounting 
as practiced makes sense only if it is assumed that the generation and 
incorporation of new technology requires only modest amounts of new capital 
10and is not particularly associated with labor of a particular kind or quality. 
Under these specifications growth of output per worker can continue so 
long as the capital labor ratio grows,, Actually the critical value of the 
elasticity of substitution in a CES model is unity; if it is below this output 
per worker for a constant technology is bounded" However for analysis of 
periods of a couple of decades at the rates of factor growth we have experienced, 
little deceleration of growth of output per worker would be experienced 
at a constant growth of capital per worker, even for an elasticity of substitution 
of as low as one half. Siuil<'.rly the growth accounting interaction term 
would not be particularly important over s-cch a time period. Growth of 
output could be explained quite well as ::he sum of the separate contributions 
of improved technology, anci j_ncrea.ses i;:i effective capital and labor. 
Consider the following alternative model which is at almost an opposite 
extreme regardinz thL two questions. Solow, Tobin, Von We.izacker and Yaari 
have proposed a model in which any productive increase in the capital 
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intensity of production requires new technology. If technological advance 
stopped today output per worker would grow for a while as firms that had 
been working with older capital shifted over to new and more productive 
machines. But once they had done this growth of output per worker would cease. 
In this model new technology is needed in order to permit productive increase 
in capital intensity but new technology cannot get into practice without new 
capital. Let me add to this structure the following. The production and 
installation of new technology requires educated workers; further in the absence 
of technological advance educated workers would be doing nothing different 
than uneducated workers and would not be more productive. 
In this theory it is natural to think of technological advance as the 
binding constraint on the Eystem; certainly growth would be impossible without 
technical advance. Traditional growth accounting would be nonsense, because 
of the strong complementarity among technological change, capital growth, and 
education. To estimate,, the contribution of technical change by subtracting', 
an estimated contribution of increases capital and education clearly would 
be absurd. 
The differences between t'he models involve not only interpretation of 
past experience, but prescription of how to improve future performance. In 
the first model it is natural to think of a number of different, and roughly 
separable, factors that might increase the growth rate. Choice among say 
more Rand D, education, and more physical investment can be made on the basis 
of rate of return, or cost benefit calculations. While in the long run the 
complementarity among the factors means that the rate of return on one is not 
independent of the level of the others, for shorter run calculations this 
can be ignored. The second model forces policy thinking in terms of 
complementary packages. Thus a policy in support of Rand Dis thought 
of as needing support by a policy of training scientists, and as being made 
effective through policies to facilitate physical investment. An interesting 
example of a policy which, to be: successful, required a rather complex 
package is the so called green revolution, as described by Hayami and 
Ruttan. 
To repeat the argument of the earlier sections, we cannot confidently 
distinguish between these two opposite extremes on the basis of growth 
accounting exercises and time series data alone. Yet the differences clearly 
are very impo:.::tant. I suspect that, if we limit ourself to nee-classical 
formulations, the right model is somewhere in between the two cases discussed 
above, but for many sectors may be closer to the second model than the first. 
We economists tend to be far too facile with our chalk (or equations) 
in drawing isoquants into regions of factor proportions that never have been 
11experienced. I would bet that in the absence of considerable research and 
development reconnaissance of the terrain, firms venturing into technologies 
with significantly higher capital labor ratios thnn actually have been 
experienced will tend initially to make mistakes, and will experie!lce a 
considerable amount of learning costs before achieving significant gains in 
output per worker. Either research and development (learning before doing) or 
learning by doing (certainly also a form of Rand D) is required to make the 
isoquant more elastic beyond the experienced range. Similarly I believe 
that economists have been much too mechanical in their treatment of the returns 
to education. It seems a safe bet that a large sha~e cf the returns to higher 
\ 
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education are tied up with the processes of technical advance and the chain 
12of economic adjustments there-by set.in train. 
These conjectures can be read as a bet in favor of one of the models 
in the neo-classical grab bag rather than another. However until the conjectures 
are proved one way or another, I would argue we really don't have much of a 
theory. One might take the position that we have a theory but no firm 
knowledge of the parameter valueso However if range of possible specifications 
of the model is as great as it seems to be this point of view seems close to 
meaningless. 
Further, if technical change is important I suspect that the kind of growth 
theory that we need is not in the current grab bag of neo-classical models as 
described by Solow. Our existing growth theory represents a rather straight­
forward dynamizing of the very statical firm and industry of Schumpeter's 
circular flow. All that g?."owth theory adds is smooth and predictable growth 
of inputs and teclmology. Sooner or later we will need to encompass the world 
of Schumpeter's Chapter 2. Innovation and change are not predictable. All 
technologies purchased now are not the best. Some firms make better choices, 
others worse. There are leaders and followers. Competition is a dynamic 
process not a static condition. Nordhaus and Tobin comment pessimistically 
on the chances of developing a Schumpeterian theory of growth. 
Many economists agree with the broad outlines of Schumpeter's 
vision of capitalist development, which is a far cry from the growth 
models made nowadays in either Cambridge, Massachusetts, or Cambridge, 
England. But visions of this kind have yet to be transformed into 
a theory that can be applied to everyday analytical and empirical work. 
suspect it will not be hard once we put our minds to it. 
One of the reasons we have not put our minds to it is that economists 
I 
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appreciate that, for all its difficulties, the nee-classical vision (I 
suggest it really is not a theory in any meaningful sense) contains some 
important germs of truth. It contains the notion that firms are not unresponsive 
to profit opportunities. It is built around the notion that outputs 
require inputs, and that part of what increases labor productivity is increase 
in resources (principally capital) per worker. Surely these we want to preserve. 
But we do not need a full blown neo-classical theory to preserve these. 
We can have them with a theory based on Schumpeterian foundations. 
What might a neo-Schumpeterian theory of growth look like? The outlines 
seem reasonably clear. In the first place the theory must avoid the repre­
sentative firm in competitive equilibrium allegory which demarks neo-classical 
theory. In a Schumpeterian growth model, at any time firms can be operating 
using different technologies, with different unit costs, some making profits, 
others making losses. Competition is a process in which profitable firms 
expand and are imitated, unprofitable ones drop out of business or find better 
ways. Such a model can 1 under certain assumptions have the equilibrium steady 
state characteristics of nee-classical theoryo Winter has developed such a 
model. But the "motion" of this kind of a model in a regime where new technology 
is being introduced is Schumpeterian. I have employed a simple model in this 
. . . h . . 1 d 1 dspirit to examine growt over time in a ess eve ope country. 13 The mode1 
generates Schumpeterian profits for the firms using the better technologies, 
which provides the funds (savings?) for their expansion relative to the less 
efficient firms, as well as the motivation. 
Second, the model should distinguish between the kinds of capabilities 
that are important in the routine steady state operation of equilibrium, 
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and the kinds of capabilities that are required for effective innovation or 
perceptive imitation. In part the mix of capabilities possessed by a firm 
may be a matter of luck; but certainly in part it is a matter of decision. 
Firms can decide to hire scientists and engineers to try to develop new 
technologies and to watch the developments of other firms, or they can decide 
not to do that. If the technology is ammenable to innovation and the firm 
or its competitors finds something new and better, these capabilities will 
pay off. If technology is not tractable the firm with an Rand D establishment 
will be saddled with costs but no benefits. And the firm that did not hire 
the R and D capability will make the profits. Undoubtedly R and D fortunes 
fluctuate and so therefore do the capabilities of firms that are associated 
with being profitable. 
Sidney Winter and I are developing a model which incorporates these 
14elements. Growth, profits, and capital formation are all generated largely 
by innovation. The industry at any time is characterized by a distribution 
of firms using different technologies, having different profitabilities, 
and expanding or contracting at different rates. Firms also differ in the 
probability that they will create an innovation, or adopt better technology 
used by others, over a given time period. Not all innovations are superior 
to existing technology, so the selection process is a key part of the model. 
Better technology, when it is created, is spread through the system both by 
expansion of the innovating firm and by imitation. Rising capital intensity 
is induced in the model through the effects on the dynamic selection system 
of increases in the wage rate, which makes profitable more capital intensive 
technology, if it is created. 
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Obviously this is a much more complicated theory than the nee-classical 
theory. What are the advantages? Note first that this theory can explain 
aggregate data at least as well as can the nee-classical theory; Winter's 
demonstration that this kind of a model can generate competitive equilibrium 
quarantees that nee-classical results can be replicated. This kind of a 
model may do better with aggregate data but its real advantages lie in 
ability to be consistent with, and perhaps to explain, disaggregated data 
and "to square with" observed process. It is our bet that real understanding 
of how growth occurs, and of how to influence it~ can be won only after 
one has stripped off the surface level of aggregate data and looked at the 
15
individual units, and understand what they really are doing. 
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Footnotes 
1. In particular there is the important study of Griliches and Jorgenson (1967),
discussion of this work by Denison (1969), and the attempt at reconciliation 
by Griliches and Jorgenson (1970). Nadiri recently has presented a general
discussion of the growth accounting literature. 
2. See for example the cautious remarks of Kendrick. 
3. Solow makes use of these same stylized facts. 
4. This is stressed in the work of Griliches and Jorgenson. 
5. Griliches and Jorgenson seem to claim this. The original statement of the 
correctness of the Divisia formula seems to be Richter's. 
6. Thus under the stylized data assumption assuming a Cobb-Douglas initially,
using initial factor shares to weight percentage factor increases, and using
the Divisia index, all amount to the same thing. 
7. That is the "shares" need to be written explicitly as a function s1 ( r{t), A(t) ). KEquation (2) needs to be specified with Si( 1 (t), A(O) ). The Richter 
specification of Equation (2) does not do this. 
8, Consider for example a Cobb-Douglas of the form: 
Q = AKl/211/2 
Assume that over a half century A doubled, and Kand L both quadrupled. Q
then would increase by a factor of eight. Each factor, had it alone changed,
would have caused a doubling of output. However given that capital and labor 
grew as they did, output would have increased only four-fold had technology 
not changed. Thus technical change would account for a four-fold increase 
in growth if its contribution was estimated as a residual over the total 
period. From another perspective, average yearly growth rates of A, K and L, 
and Q would have been 1.4%, 2. 8%, and 4. 2%. The sum of the "average yearly
contributions" of each factor would add up to total average yearly growth.
But note that in the final year the contribution of any of these factors 
taken alone would have been only one fourth as much as it actually was had the 
other factors remained constant over the entire period. 
9. This is so for models that aggregate capital and which "quality adjust"
labor. Not all of the neo-classical models are of this kind. 
10. For a similar discussion see Fellner (1970). 
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11. Fellner (1970) makes a similar point. 
12. For models in this spirit see Nelson and Phelps, and Welch. 
13. Nelson (1968). 
14. For a discussion in more detail of certain aspects of our modeling see 
Nelson (1971). 
15. Relatedly we believe that progress toward a theory of growth will require 
that different sectors be studied and treated separately. 
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